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Contingent relations, cult(ure)s of respectability and youth mobilizations in the oil rich 
Niger Delta 
 
Akin Iwilade 
Introduction 
Social mobilization in the Niger Delta revolves around the political economy of extraction and 
the various pressure points through which competing actors stake their claims against the 
Nigerian oil industry. These pressures range from resource distribution, environmental and 
resource rights, and livelihood distortions created by the ubiquitous oil sector. Youth is often 
right at the center of receiving both the worst of the pressures as well as championing the 
resistance to it. As is to be expected, social and political action around these issues have been 
the key entry points through which both popular and scholarly observers have attempted to 
understand and explain the Niger Delta (Obi 2009, Oluwaniyi 2010, Iwilade 2014).   
But for all of the Delta literatureÕs robust engagement with social mobilization in the region, 
many of the subtle but important basis and forms of social mobilization are often lost in a 
narrative dominated by resistance, marginalization and repression. Yet, the evidence suggests 
that these processes of resistance are underpinned in part by youth mobilizations in the region 
which are intricately linked to the subtle but powerful politics of respectability and to the 
interesting ways in which it shapes behavior within youth cults/gangs. There is also 
considerable evidence that social mobilization is often dependent on provisional (even 
fortuitous) actions which ultimately build contingent networks that are able to navigate the 
uncertain social conditions imposed by the oil economy. These two tools through which youth 
imagine themselves as well as mobilize against the state and oil multinationals Ðbut also 
sometimes in defence of this very same alliance- have been largely ignored by the literature.  
This paper brings these issues to the fore and examines how youth use respectability and 
contingency as tools for social mobilization in NigeriaÕs Niger Delta. It explores the concepts 
of Alaowei and kemeowei, the tensions that temporality and ageing impose on them and how 
they aid social mobilization among violent youth actors. It also links temporality to the building 
of contingent network relations and shows how these shape new forms of social mobilization 
in the Niger Delta. 
In order to address these issues, this paper is divided into four interconnected substantive 
sections. The first section contextualizes the politics of oil extraction in the Niger Delta and 
the place of youth in it. The next section then briefly discusses what it means to be Kemowei 
and highlights the struggles of youth to find meaning both through it and within the spaces it 
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structures. The section that follows provides a broader discussion about the role of 
respectability, as captured by the notion of Alaowei in the mobilization strategies of Delta 
youth cults and gangs. The paper then moves on to discuss contingency as a tool of social 
mobilization. 
 
Youth, oil extraction and politics in the Niger Delta 
Analysing the long duree of global energy history, Michael Watts (2003: 5089) makes the point 
that Ôthe annals of oil are an uninterrupted chronicle of naked aggression, genocide and the 
violent law of the corporate frontierÕ. While this damning assessment may not reflect the reality 
of states like Norway who seem to have largely escaped the resource curse (Belkina & Sarkova 
2014), it is borne out in many ways in the oil rich but volatile Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
Far from being a resource for development, oil appears to have become a violent force that has 
blighted the environment, society and politics of the region, as well as Nigeria more broadly 
(Okonta 2002, Obi 2006, Iwilade 2012).  
In the time between the Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of Southern Nigeria enacted in 
1907, the Colonial Minerals Ordinance No 17 of 1914, and the launching of the Presidential 
Amnesty Programme in 2009, the Niger Delta became both a source of hope as well as a 
symbol of much of what is wrong with the rentier post- colony. This paradox is articulated in 
multiple ways across the Niger Delta and highlights the complexity of a region whose constant 
upheavals signpost the failures of the state and the implications these failures can have for the 
most vulnerable social categories residing within its borders. From the paradox of wealth and 
poverty (Imobigbe 2011), to that of a shared sense of deprivation nestling in often violent 
inter/intra-ethnic tensions (Welch 1995, Nwajiaku 2005) and of the difference between state 
and community conceptions of security (Ibeanu 2002), the region has had the worst that the 
political economy of oil extraction has to offer. Watts (2010: 61) captures this paradox when 
he noted that Nigerian oil-fuelled capitalism contains a:  
Ôdouble-movement...on the one hand a centralizing force, that rendered the state more 
visible (and globalized), and...financially underwrote, a process of secular nationalism 
and state building. On the other, centralized oil revenues flowing into weak institutions 
and a charged, volatile federal system produced...corrupt and flabby oil-led development 
that was to...discredit the stateÕ.  
These contradictory impacts of oil in the Niger Delta underline not just the complexity of the 
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resource (or indeed natural resources extraction more generally) as a driver of development but 
also the specific ways in which postcolonial institutions can shape or be shaped by the flow of 
a globally relevant commodity.  
Perhaps no social category has responded politically and socially to these contradictions in the 
Niger Delta in the way its youth have. Youth have confronted the state in spite of being faced 
with a social landscape that is immensely constraining and repressive in the formal sense. They 
have done this by exploiting the incredible opportunities for innovative self expression that 
exists within the DeltaÕs informal spaces. On the one hand, they violently challenge state 
authority and attempt to renegotiate the very meanings of citizenship. On the other hand 
however, they collaborate with many of its levers of power (including the armed forces) to 
subvert the very formal structures and rules that seek to repress them and against which they 
often struggle. As a consequence, they are often able to establish alternative forms of 
governance or at least embed themselves within the highly lucrative systems of patronage 
around which the oil industry turns. 
Youthhood is itself a primary site through which contestations for access to the revenue from 
oil extraction are fought out. For one, those who get to define themselves as youth are able to 
appropriate a lucrative identity that is actively feted by both the state and oil multinationals. 
This has become even more relevant in the years since 2009 when the governmentÕs official 
DDR project (the Presidential Amnesty Programme) was launched. This programme focused 
on providing pay offs to violent youth, thus enhancing their status as champions of the 
beleaguered Niger Delta (Abazie-Humphrey 2014, Obi 2014) and intensifying the struggle to 
acquire the status of militant youth (Nwajiakwu-Dahou 2012).  
The governmentÕs focus on violent youth militia for its Amnesty project shifted the politics of 
respectability within the militias in profound ways. For one, it created conditions which made 
the temporalities of age(ing) an important part of how respectability is conceptualized and used 
as a tool of mobilization by youth. As the next section will show, the Amnesty demeaned active 
violence at the same time that it rewarded those who could lay claim to historical violence. At 
a particular disadvantage were those youth who, even though they could claim to have been 
historically violent (that is having participated in militancy), had not attained financial 
independence and thus, social maturity. For this group, age(ing) is a liability and circulating 
the post Amnesty landscape meant navigating changing meanings of respectability. 
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Being Alaowei and being youth 
Among the Ijaw people of Ekeremor in the oil state of Bayelsa, it is said that the main goal of 
a man in life is to become Alaowei. The word Alaowei is derived from Ala, meaning ÔkingÕ and 
ÔoweiÕ meaning ÔmanÕ. Taking together, ÔAlaÕ and ÔoweiÕ or ÔalaoweiÕ refers to an advanced 
state of manhood in which a man becomes a man of respect and means. To become alaowei, a 
male must first become kemeowei, that is Ôbe a manÕ. Kemeowei is derived from the words 
ÔkemeÕ meaning ÔhumanÕ and Owei meaning ÔmaleÕ. The etymology of the words indicate a 
linkage between gaining respect, being a man and being human. The implication is that oneÕs 
very humanity is in doubt until one can claim the status of Kemowei and that to qualify for 
social status, one must become not just a man but a man of means.  
The notion of who qualifies as Alaowei reflects both the social imaginary of a people who look 
to a largely sanitized past in which basic values of respect and community are supposedly 
central to social organization, as well as the demands of a new modernity in which social 
mobility often demands acts of violence, corruption and exploitation. Combining these two 
spaces of respectability (the sanitized past and the violent present) brings to mind the 
distinction that Roitman (2006) makes between illegality and illegitimacy. In her chapter on 
the Òethics of illegalityÓ, she argues that even though social actors are often aware of the 
legality or otherwise of their actions, the fact of illegality does not necessarily make the action 
illegitimate. Indeed, the pursuit of legitimate but otherwise illegal action is sometimes the 
source of the moral legitimacy with which actors claim respect. This conception of ethics 
within illegal social action illustrates the struggle of social groups to reconstruct respectability 
(or if you will; legitimacy) from the hallowed ruins of a distant value driven past and the 
realities of a violent materialist present. The past in this context represents the legitimate while 
the present represents the illegal and gaining respect or becoming Kemowei thus requires an 
artful balancing of these two competing worlds, creating constantly shifting notions of 
respectability.  
The balancing process also often requires performing respectability when actually being 
respectable or, if one likes, Ôbeing alaoweiÕ, is difficult or momentarily impossible. Across 
various youth contexts, many writers have shown how the performance of respectability can 
be central to social relationships and mobility. Sasha NewellÕs account of Ivorian les bluffeurs 
for instance, offers useful comparative insights into the dynamics of respect and shows how 
such activities can make sense within what he called a Ôcosmology of social practiceÕ that 
extract meaning from local contexts and rethinks Ôconnections between mimesis (the magic of 
the copy) and the postcolonial relationship to modernity (Newell: 2012: 3). In this regard, youth 
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appropriate and perform actions that help signal their respectability even when their material 
circumstances do not quite meet the alaowei status. The implication of this is that even though 
access to the material accoutrements of ÔmodernityÕ and social respectability are important, 
they are only socially useful in so far as possessing them can be signaled through what Veblen 
(1899) called Ôconspicuous consumptionÕ. Those who donÕt actually possess them, can 
navigate social relationships merely by performing consumption. Friedman (1994), makes the 
point, in relation to the extravagance of CongoÕs Sapeurs, that consumption is essentially about 
self-making, self definition and self-maintenance rather than a rationalist mode of economic 
accumulation. By linking consumption to self-making, FriedmanÕs work, like that of Newell  
2012) illustrate the innovative ways in which youth inhabit social spaces by profoundly 
questioning dominant modernities at the same time that they seek to express it.  
The multiple struggles for respect that young people are engrossed with also illuminate the 
shifting meanings of youth itself. They highlight, for instance, how young people respond to 
specific labels which try to impose pejorative meanings on youthhood. These meanings include 
the idea of youth as unruly and disruptive of normal social order (Mokwena 1991, Sharp 1992, 
Abdullah 1997), or of youth as signifying dependence, marginality and exclusion (Stohl 2002, 
Mcmullin and Loughry 2004, Abbink 2005). To locate the meaning of youth one needs to 
acknowledge, as noted by Bayart (2009), four key things. First, that it is important to view 
youth as a social category within an intergenerational discourse. Second, this intergenerational 
discourse must be placed within a broader debate about the important ways in which power, 
authority and control frames social categories. Third, one must take due note of the shifting 
nature of power itself and how it affects the ways in which youth inhabits social spaces. Finally, 
one must view youth both as a lived experience as well as an imagined one (Chrisiantsen, Utas 
and Vigh 2006, Bayart 2009; Ukeje & Iwilade 2012).  
With regard to these four perspectives, one can discern that generational categories, such as 
childhood, youth and adulthood, are not neutral or even natural, but rather a Ôpart of the struggle 
for influence and authority within almost every societyÕ (Christiantine, Utas and Vigh 2006: 
11). Related to this struggle is a growing youth appropriation of the public sphere, a situation 
made largely possible by the emergence of new media technologies and all the empowering 
characteristics that they bear. As a consequence, youth has become a very critical category 
through which we may understand the dynamics of power, influence and control in the public 
sphere.  
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Where youth have to engage with levers of power in violent conflict contexts, the social 
meaning of the term could change profoundly. For one, being youth becomes an essentially 
active label. It tends to refer to those who circulate within what Maira and Soep (2005) called 
youthscapes and who participate actively in the disruptive processes of renegotiating the 
meanings of citizenship, of politics and of power. This means that being youth is profoundly 
different from being young. To be young, one needs to be socially marginal and be subject to 
social mores, even when those prevent effective navigation of multiple uncertainties. Youth 
however is an acquired status available only to those who are embedded in or can access the 
many violent networks that shape life experiences. Thinking about youth this way highlights a 
number of important issues. First, it underscores the centrality of actively Ôdoing thingsÕ, that 
is, in the case of the Niger Delta, of participating in the gang culture to qualify to be youth. 
Being of the right generation or having similar experiences of social life means little if one is 
not within the networks of violence involved in the multiplicities of disruptive activities in the 
region. Youth in this sense captures a broad range of similar conflict or unstable contexts in 
which generational politics has thrown up a specific category of young people who have 
become socialised into violence on the one hand and who constantly stand in disruptive 
opposition to established authority from Guinea Bissau to El Barrio (Mokwena 1991, Burgess 
1995, Vigh 2009). I use disruptive here not in a pejorative sense but to capture activities 
designed to challenge social norms or to renegotiate social relations. ÔYouthÕ in this sense is 
apparently a ÔverbÕ rather than a ÔnounÕ.  
Second, while youthfulness can be individual in itself, to be youth in ways that matter to social 
navigation, it has to be expressed within the context of a social group. This implies that ÔyouthÕ 
is not just a verb, it is also a plural one.  
The implications of this verb(ial) conceptualization of ÔyouthÕ are profound. In the first place, 
it fractures the generational category of the young and ultimately privileges those whose 
activities can be most disruptive of the social order. Many post conflict projects appear to 
disaggregate the generational category of the young along the verb(ial) distinction being 
proposed here. For instance, the 2009 Presidential Amnesty in the Niger Delta was structured 
in a way that makes a clear distinction between the young and the youth and focussed placating 
the political youth. The varied categories of Ôex-fightersÕ, Ôchild soldiersÕ, ÔrebelsÕ and so on, 
speak to a generational category of active social actors defined not so much by their age (social 
or biological) but to their disruptive engagement with established social order. Youth is not 
something one merely becomes, it is something one ÔdoesÕ. In other words, if we are to fully 
appreciate the impact of social consciousness it is important to understand that youth cannot 
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simply be Ôimagined or livedÕ (Chrisiantsen, Utas and Vigh 2006), it also has to be ÔdoneÕ and 
in that way we can analytically separate social actors from a less forceful and marginalised 
generational category.  
The contemporary history of the Niger Delta is in some ways a narrative of the coming of age 
of youth who, in the face of state repression and multinational oil company irresponsibility, 
discovered voice and activated latent agency (Obi 2009, Ebiede 2016, Iwilade 2017). Yet, the 
narrative is also about young people in the grip of manipulative patrimonial relationships who 
are recruited to violent causes that they neither believe in nor which they will significantly 
benefit from (Ezeonu 2014). Somewhere along this spectrum of agency and helplessness, 
young people experience and shape the social, political and economic implications of oil 
extraction in profound ways.  
For many youth trying to survive within the Niger DeltaÕs violent oil political economy, their 
struggles are both framed and complicated by the pursuit of respectability and the shifting ways 
in which it impacts on their relationships with the repressive apparatus of the state. 
Respectability resonates profoundly and becoming Alaowei is the climax of a lifelong struggle 
to attain social maturity and adulthood and to do so by fulfilling the needs of the imagined past 
as well as the real present. It is the end for which various social tools, structures and systems 
are simply the means to attaining. It is however an ÔendÕ that is quite undefined- an end that 
often ends in itself- sending its victim back to the starting line, often in a daze as to what exactly 
is respectable within that space or time or in fact what will be respectable after this phase of 
the struggle is done.  
 
Cult(ure)s of respectability in the oil Delta and the temporalities of respect 
But how do Niger Delta youth imagine themselves and how does that imagination encourage 
youth to seek mobilization and participation in networks that promise so much precarity and 
danger? There are various answers to these questions. One may for instance, as Adunbi (2015) 
argued, claim that they are driven by the need to fulfill ancestral promises or, in ObiÕs (2010) 
opinion, driven by an acute awareness of the marginalization of the region by the Nigerian 
State. One may also link it to criminality (Ezeonu 2014, Ingwe 2015). All three have been 
addressed quite richly in the literature and there is evidence that these motivations interact in 
complex ways and together can explain a great deal of youth mobilization in the region. Yet, 
for all their dominance of the literature in trying to explain youth mobilization and politics in 
the Delta, fieldwork data suggests that something else is also at least as important to the 
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sociality of youth as is history, marginalization or criminality. This often ignored, yet, 
important driver of youth sociality in the Niger Delta is the search for respectability.  
The struggle to create what Connell and Messerchmidt (2005) referred to as hegemonic 
masculinity is occurring within two categories of youth in the ex-militant networks of 
Yenagoa
1
. These categories are the so-called Ôover-age youthÕ (men in their late thirties and 
forties, sometimes even above fifty)
2
 and the younger elements within the networks. Within 
ex-militant networks, there are a number of men, usually in their late thirties and forties, who 
had relatively high positions during the insurgency but have now become sad reminders of the 
politics of abandonment in the region. One of such men is UG. I first heard of him through 
recommendations from a contact in Yenagoa who thought he was in a good position to tell me 
all I needed to know about ex-militants in Bayelsa. When his name again came up a number of 
times in conversations with ex-militants in Port Harcourt, I knew he was someone I had to 
speak with. After weeks of phone calls mediated by my contact in Yenagoa, who is a young 
civil servant in the Bayelsa State service, UG eventually agreed to meet with me at his home 
on Yenagoa.  
I met UG drinking with friends and comrades just by his small run down apartment. Parked 
outside his door was a brand new commuter bus belonging to the Ijaw Youth Council and 
which had been donated by the former minister of petroleum resources, Mrs Diezani Allison-
Madueke. He was obviously a popular figure in the neighbourhood as many people greeted 
him warmly and I even got to see him in action when he was invited to help evict a guard whose 
boss had fired, but who refused to leave.  
His home bore little evidence of how high up he had been within militant networks. It was 
clean but very sparsely furnished. It was also damp, a sign that it was not fully protected from 
the heavy moist in the Yenagoa air. He had a very distinguished air but it was obvious that 
frustration ran deeply below the surface as he spoke a lot about abandonment, the Ôinferiority 
complexÕ of the local politicians who now run the area and how the Niger Delta still has not 
																																																								
1	Yenagoa is the capital of the oil rich state of Bayelsa.	
2	These are often men in their late thirties to early fifties who circulate within the Delta youth culture but have 
aged before being able to attain social adulthood. They are usually experienced in the politics of the Ijaw Youth 
Council and other similar youth organisations but still dependent on patrons for their basic material needs. They 
are not really ÔyouthÕ in the sense of being young, but they are also not elders in the sense of social independence. 
They are therefore referred to by youth in the region as Ôover-youthÕ  
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gotten a fair enough deal from the Nigerian state.  
UG did not tell me his age, but he appears to be in his early forties since he spoke of his 
activities in the mid 2000s as a Ôthirty something year old manÕ. Before the Amnesty, UG had 
been a prominent mid-level commander in the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA) and Niger 
Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF). He had also worked directly with the leadership of the IYC 
in the early periods shortly after its formation. He also had personal connections with well 
known senior militant commanders as well as links all across the Niger Delta. One would 
expect that an Ôex- militantÕ of his stature would have personally benefited much more from 
the millions of dollars in state patronage that have been channeled towards militants through 
the Amnesty and Post Amnesty Programmes as well as the lucrative pipeline protection 
contracts (Ubhenin 2013). After all, there is evidence all over the Niger Delta of the dramatic 
changes in the personal circumstances of militants (Ubhenin 2013). UG himself made clear of 
this when he told me that:  
Those who thought we are bad guys, you know you hardly see pastors in militancy, but 
you know people that were written off have built big houses. Even most of those who 
even went straight, went through the normal education system, kept to the law, who are 
maybe lawyers or doctors donÕt have anything to show for it. If you move around my 
state now, most beautiful houses you can find are owned by ex-militants. Some of them 
are using their money to try to mend their ways, I know people who now help widows 
and so on. Maybe they were not like that naturally, you know the environment can change 
people. Not all of us got that kind of money...Me? Well you have seen my house, do I 
look like someone that made millions or billions? As I am, I have known many people 
from years back, when we were nothing. But today, fingers are not equal. Some of them 
have become big, if they hear my name today they will be happy Ôasking ah, where have 
you been?Õ I am still the same man, but no money.  
After years in the DeltaÕs militant networks, UG is acutely aware of the missed opportunity he 
has had with regard to making it big through the Post Amnesty Programme. Seeing many 
youth, some of whom had been much lower in the militant pecking order or who in fact were 
not even involved with militancy but had somehow acquired the status as a result of 
connections to all sorts of patrons, make personal strides, fills him with both consternation and 
pride. He is proud that the sacrifices they made had at least brought some measure of 
advancement to the personal lives of many youth within the region. He is however bitter that 
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he himself had not been able to make much of the Amnesty. Even though he was enrolled and 
got to travel to South Africa for training, his personal circumstance does not seem to have 
changed much. This material deficit, coupled with his advancing age, places him squarely in 
the over- age youth category.  
Anthropologists have often argued that age is one of the many ways in which people produce 
and inhabit social time (James & Milles 2005, Johnson-Hanks 2006, Cole 2010, Meiu 2014). 
For the over-age youth in YenagoaÕs ex-militant networks however, age appears to be a major 
constraint if it is not accompanied by other indices of social maturation like financial 
independence. Indeed, becoming over-age within youth networks is linked to new constraints 
to social maturation and inhibits the movement of affected persons into Alaowei status. Over-
age youth inhabit a space where notions of failed masculinities are particularly evident, a kind 
of limbo in which the Ôtemporalities of ageingÕ (Meiu 2014: 4) as well as the reality of poverty 
conspire to subvert the respectability many had attained during the heady days of violent 
militancy. The Post amnesty period represents for many over-age youth in the Delta, the type 
of space Nauja Kleist (2010) described in the case of diaspora Somali men in London and 
Copenhagen. Kleist describes their attempts to negotiate respectable masculinity in the context 
of displacement in these Western cities. Here, the inability of Somali diaspora men to maintain 
old systems of recognition and privilege is deepened by a gendered empowerment of women 
in the West, thus creating acute feelings of failed masculinity which is over compensated for 
by the creation of Ôalternative social spaces of recognition in which respectable masculinity 
can be re-enactedÕ (Kleist 2010: 187).  
For individual actors like UG, the possibility of re-enacting the old measures of respectability, 
which were of course violent, has also been put paid to by the Amnesty through its relentless 
demand for peace. They are thus left to create versions of masculine respectability that is 
legitimated by their violent past but dependent on their ability to maintain links with far more 
materially successful and often younger/junior comrades. The transition is far from an easy one 
for the over-age youth who, having failed to become social adults, have to circulate within 
youth spaces; claiming the Ôhigh tableÕ at meetings or becoming ÔpatronsÕ. UG explained this 
by saying that during the 2003-9 violence, he had no fear, that if he wanted to do anything, he 
just did it. Now however, according to him, his Ôonly fear is ageÕ (UG int 2014). He does have 
a reason to fear ageing. Having made little money from the DDR process of the Amnesty, he 
is still too poor to claim his place within the Ijaw National Congress (INC), which is the parent 
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body for the IYC but has become too old to participate fully in the IYC. In order to retain a 
hold on old respect, UG and people of his generation have become latter day peace advocates 
who try to shape the respectability debate away from violence, wealth and consumption. They 
call to values like consistency, philanthropy, integrity as new sites of respectability and attempt 
to steer the more privileged youth towards it. It is evident, that even when they are not exactly 
conscious of this social tactic, they are articulating tactical agency in ways that allow them to 
re-invent themselves in order to cope with the changing nature of the post amnesty Niger Delta 
as well as its implications for youth politics. UGÕs personal story highlights the dilemma faced 
by the so-called over-age youth. He expresses many of these sentiments when he told me, in 
relation to keeping younger militants in check:  
You know the type of people you are talking about, most of them are stark illiterates. For 
you to assemble such people together its not easy. You know for we the Ijaw, Ijaw means 
truth. Anything we do, we like to apply that truth. We must be truthful in all that we do. 
We also have the Egbesu, the god that will punish you if you do something wrong. The 
moment you steal or rape, you will die. You must be pure. We even fast, sometimes you 
canÕt eat food prepared by a woman or sleep with a woman; you must be pure. ItÕs not 
easy. There must always be a repercussion for bad behaviour. There is wide discipline in 
the camps, otherwise you canÕt control them. That is why people can be guided.  
He also highlights the new forms of respectability the so-called over-youth category 
consistently tries to create when he told me, in response to the question Ôhow would a youth 
earn respect?Õ that:  
Respect is not just fighting about or showing off with money. Some people just have 
money, but you have to believe in something. You canÕt be going about just because of 
money. Your relationship with people is what matters most. If someone dies today, itÕs 
not the cars or money that makes someone cry, it is the relationship he has with people. 
To be respected, you have to build trust with people around you. In South Africa they 
have a slang they call Ubuntu. It has three legs, which symbolizes respect, 
communalization, and ...I forgot the third one. But you see that no matter what you do, 
someone can tell something about your life style. That is when you begin to get respect 
from people, command. If you keep to your words, people will trust you. Like Jesus 
Christ [said] Ôsilver and gold I have noneÕ. I go to places to buy things, they donÕt know 
my house, but they give me things on credit, because they know I will pay back. That is 
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why I say my name anywhere I go. Some of these boys have made money, so they donÕt 
know how to be good people. We the old ones must teach them. ThatÕs the way.  
This value set is fundamentally different from that of everyday militant youth who seem to 
prioritize violence as well as conspicuous consumption. Indeed, it is a major shift from UGÕs 
own admitted values in the years when he himself was an everyday rather than Ôover-ageÕ youth 
for whom violence and its performance were key to respectability. These dramatic changes in 
the notion of respectability as well as the specific social situations of those who champion one 
version or the other, justifies the conceptualization of respect as a site of contestation and 
highlights one of the most important dynamic of youth politics in Post Amnesty Niger Delta.  
It would appear that mid-level commanders in Delta militias occupy very similar social 
positions as that described by Themner (2012:205-23) in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
Their struggles for respect are intimately bound up in the very nature of post-conflict peace-
building projects that tend to focus on the co-option of two levels of youth militias Ðthe most 
senior commanders and the foot soldiers. This deepens the challenge of post-conflict transitions 
for mid-level commanders who often lose their authority as well as sense of self worth and 
respectability. The story of UG however shows that social networks can often recreate 
themselves in an attempt to respond to these challenges.  
Temporality, contingency and Youth Mobilization in the oil Delta 
To participate in the complex landscape of youth politics and social resistance in the Niger 
Delta, actors have to become Alaowei or at least perform it. This burden of becoming Alaowei 
however does not rest solely on individual youth. In order to attract followership, Delta gangs 
also have to demonstrate the ability to endow members with the respectability. It is interesting 
to note that in post Amnesty Niger Delta, partly as a consequence of the dynamics of 
temporality and the consequent changes to how respectability is defined as the UG case shows, 
militant Delta gangs have lost significant elements of their pull effect and attractiveness to 
youth. The Amnesty appears to have created a social environment in which social mobilization 
is increasingly dependent not on the old logics of network building but on new ones which 
emphasize spontaneity and contingency as well as oneÕs place in time.  
One particularly important element of collective organisation and social violence in the Niger 
Delta that is hardly ever taking into account is the role that fortuitous, sudden and provisional 
actions or events play in generating these popular movements. It is often taken for granted that 
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grievances or motivations for political action are rooted in the turbulent history of the region 
and that social categories (especially youth) constantly respond to cues from years of state 
neglect and marginalisation. Yet, contingent and provisional actions are sometimes at the core 
of social mobilisation and those other affinities are tools deployed by youth in the service of 
tactical agency. What is obvious from the literature though is that contingency is notably 
ignored by analysts in spite of considerable evidence that it is a pervasive form of organizing 
in the region.  
But what do we mean when we talk of contingency or of contingent networks? A few things 
come to mind. The first is the role of ÔchanceÕ, ÔspontaneityÕ or ÔunpredictabilityÕ. Making a 
living or simply surviving within spaces where state presence is at best weak, infrastructure is 
inadequate and in which multiple social formations compete to impose alternative visions of 
citizenship often requires delicate social navigation skills that thrive on its spontaneity, 
flexibility and adaptability (Evans & Furlong 1997, Vigh 2009). Often unacknowledged in 
studies of the Delta conflict is the implication of this fluid context for social action. Framing 
youth politics and collective mobilization through contingency indicates an acknowledgement 
that historical identities, important as they are, often require contemporary triggers that 
transform deep seated emotions into political action. It is the unpredictability of what this 
trigger would be or when it would come that is ÔcontingentÕ.  
This leads to another important aspect of contingency which is temporality already touched on 
in the previous section. In order for a social action to be ÔcontingentÕ it has to happen within a 
specific temporal space in which it is able to fundamentally shape the direction of individual 
life choices and ultimately of group action. As Doug and Sewell (2001) put it, it is really Ôabout 
timeÕ. In that 2001 article, Doug and Sewell make a case for the timing of fortuitous events and 
conclude that in order for contentious social action to even occur at all, the time must be right 
for it in that it must occur when it is able to feed off enabling social structures (towards 
collective organising, shared sense of grievance and actionable goal). Temporality in this sense 
also indicates elements of chance and unpredictability.  
Finally, the fact that the initial provisional action occurs does not necessarily mean that a 
contingent network can emerge. For instance, in order for outrage over the self immolation of 
the Tunisian fruit seller, Tareq Mohammed Boazizi
3 
to grow into the kind of coordinated 
																																																								
3	Tareq Bouazizi was a College graduate who eked out a living as a fruit seller in the small town of Sidi Bouzid 
in Tunisia. On December 17th 2010, he was accosted by police for allegedly selling fruit without a license. His 
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protest movement that became the Arab Spring, provisional individual or group responses must 
be able to morph into what Beissinger (2011: 26) described as Ôinterrelated contingencies [in 
other words] a linkchain of events in which the outcome of one link became an important initial 
condition for anotherÕ. Contingency is therefore not just about unpredictability but it also 
highlights that sometimes there is no opposition between spontaneity and organization and that 
youth networks often have to combine these two features in a continuous iteration that helps 
them create social organizations that are simultaneously nimble and fixed.  
   
As a tool for and a form of social mobilization in the Niger Delta, networks emerging out of 
contingent relationships and provisional actions are fairly potent. The Colombia 
neighbourhood of Port Harcourt provides an interesting illustration of how this occurs. The 
neighbourhood that local youth refer to as ÔColombiaÕ, partly, I am told, in reference to what 
they consider its similarities to the violent drug driven reputation of the Latin American state 
itself, comprises of residential streets officially known as Victoria, Niger and Bende. These 
streets are densely populated and teem with large populations of young men many of which 
belonged to the Agaba socio-cultural group. The heart is at Niger and Bende streets which had 
between them, in the years before Amnesty was offered in 2009, a large open playground called 
the ÔNumber One FieldÕ that became a hub for drug dealing, gang hangouts and violent clashes. 
This open field was bound on one side by small temporary wooden shacks where young women 
sold bottles of locally made gin, fish pepper soup and sex. Close to the field was a large brothel 
called the Romeo Night Club which provided more permanent fixtures for illicit transactional 
sex and drug dealing. Young people gathered there every evening to hang out and of course do 
all sorts of illegal activities within a space that offered relative protection from the law. 
Underneath the criminal, chaotic and tough faade of Colombia was a highly complex system 
of collective organization, social order and mutual support that prided itself in its precarity and 
thrived on its distance from formal authority. The Number One Field itself was a relic of a 
previous attempt by the state government to provide sports infrastructure for local youth that 
was later abandoned in the late 1980s as the pressure of structural adjustment began to bear 
																																																								
wares were confiscated including his electronic weighing scale. The humiliation of the arrest and the refusal of 
the town governor to meet with him or redress the situation caused him to douse himself with paint thinner and 
set himself on fire. His self immolation triggered massive protests that caused the overthrow of governments 
across the Middle East. 
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down on the fiscal health of the government. The economic improvements since the return of 
civilian rule has however resuscitated the project, and the open spaces which were the center 
of the Colombia life being described here have since been reclaimed by the government. The 
stories that relate directly to the open field that adjoins the Niger-Bende streets are therefore 
the recollections of community members who were active in the area from about 1995 to 2009.  
Colombia was a space where young people created alternate cultures and realities, driving out 
as far as they could, the reach of the state as well as traditional notions of social order, normality 
and respectability. Colombia illustrates the way social groups can, according to Routledge 
(1997: 70), Ôendow space with amalgams of different meanings, uses and valuesÕ. Indeed, to 
all intents and purposes, the very name Colombia indicated acute awareness of the transnational 
implications of urban violence and instability that few societies encapsulated better in the 
1990s than the narcotics and corruption fuelled violence of the period in the real Colombia.  
In spite of the violent faade of Colombia, it was a rowdy fun place to be for many youth and 
it naturally attracted police attention, much of it benign. Occasionally however, the informal 
circulation of police becomes formal state raids on the area. It was during one of these raids 
that the police came in to break up a scuffle and wounded Gowon, who was the defacto gang 
leader in the neighbourhood. As the story went, upon return from the hospital, Gowon brought 
together disparate informal groups of youth from adjoining streets, including Victoria, Bende 
and a few from Creek Road and formed what they called ÔOXÕ. That fortuitous Christmas attack 
on Colombia by police triggered a series of events which played a role in shaping the DeltaÕs 
gang universe into what it is today and illustrates the role of contingency in youth mobilization.   
As noted above, the fact of contingency does not divorce specific trigger events from the social 
universe in which they occur. As Marx wrote in the case of the proletarian revolution, 
movements usually rise gradually and that rise culminates (inevitably he avers) in a revolution 
which is tied irrevocably to the historic unfolding and deepening of the inherent contradictions 
of capitalism (see McAdam and Sewell 2001: 90). This means that even when we identify 
trigger events, they still need to be situated in history (Laterza 2015, Phillips 2016). To 
illustrate in this context, the police raid that led to injury to Gowon was not, by itself, an 
unexpected event in Colombia, the rest of the Delta or in fact Nigeria more generally. In fact, 
police harassment of Colombia youth was such a regular occurrence that one of the residents 
of the neighbourhood at the time described young people as Automated Teller Machines from 
which police drew bribes whenever they felt like it. Why then was this particular event of 
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particular significance and why did it trigger BeissingerÕs (2011) so called Ôlink-chain of 
eventsÕ that eventually created a viable, vibrant and constantly evolving resistance network? 
One key factor was that unlike other raids in which unofficial arrests were made by the police, 
often with minimal violence, and in which the arrested youth were simply roughed up for small 
bribes and released almost immediately, this particular raid turned violent very quickly. As it 
was described by Louis (int 2014),  
the police always came here. That was normal, especially during a carnival or any party. 
They always showed up to take money from the boys. You know how these things are! 
That day however some boys from Diobu were there and they didnÕt really know the 
police people. you know some of them were not in uniform. The Diobu boys thought it 
was Axe men (a violent cult group based mainly in the Universities) or something, so 
they began to fight them. As Gowon tried to intervene to resolve the matter, one of the 
police men hit him with his gun, everything just scattered after then.  
It appears that had the youth from outside Colombia not been present at that event, the police 
raid could be expected to have ended the way the many previous ones had- a minor shakedown 
and rapid return to normalcy. The resistance put up by the non- Colombia youth could have 
caused a fracas more intense than usual, but was perhaps not enough, on its own, to have 
triggered the reaction to create a more institutionalised form of resistance that Gowon and his 
acolytes created soon after the incident. It is perhaps conceivable that if Gowon himself had 
not been attacked and seriously injured by the police, the dynamics of their (Colombia youth) 
precarious but obviously stable relations with law enforcement would not have changed so 
fundamentally to the point that violence became an acceptable tool for communication.  
But perhaps most instructive is the broader context of the police raid and what was going on 
within the Niger Delta around that time. From 1993, the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) had reignited the debate about resource and environmental rights in 
the oil producing region and there was growing resentment of the repressive response of the 
military government of General Sani Abacha. By the time of the Colombia incident sometime 
around 1995, Ogoni was in turmoil following the arrest of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others for 
alleged complicity in the murder of four Ogoni elders. Of course these Saro-Wiwa incidents 
did not happen in Colombia, but it had profound impact on the narratives of citizenship and 
belonging in the entire Delta region (and perhaps even across the country). What is significant 
was that the police raid on Colombia occurred at a time when the repressive apparatus of the 
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Nigerian State was generating intense public resentment and the MOSOP example was 
highlighting both the precarity of resistance as well as its necessity and inevitability. It is also 
important to note that there was a long history of social change and resistance to the state 
especially with regard to minority rights and the questions surrounding the fair distribution of 
oil revenue in the region and thus even the MOSOP movement prevailing at the time was not 
occurring in a vacuum. Louis (int 2014) alluded to the influence of the Ogoni movement for 
the way leaders of the Colombia gangs framed what was a relatively common occurrence. In 
his words,  
Everyone was tired of the army people, just harassing everybody and the police beating 
people up. You know that time was Abacha time? You remember NADECO
4 
and all the 
problem with Saro Wiwa? You see, all that taught us a thing or two.  
While some studies of social action tend to argue that movements are responsive to sudden 
dramatic disruptions in peopleÕs lives which supposedly motivates them to seek a restoration 
of more acceptable orders (see Gurr 1971, Turner & Killian 1972), in finding an explanation 
for the response of Colombia youth to police harassment, it is useful to combine the relevance 
of the moment (the specific police attack) with that of history. Contingency emerges precisely 
from the fortuitous combination of the present and history as demonstrated in the establishment 
of Colombia Ôs OX and subsequent years of violence against the police, and each other.   
LaterzaÕs (2015) analysis of spontaneous labour strike in the town of Enkopolwani in 
Swaziland draws on Polanyi (1944) to argue for a similar connection between provisional 
action and the established order for popular organization. He notes that political actions (in this 
case labour strikes) Ôtake place in the wider political context of contestation over the 
conventional forms of representative democracy. They are one important symptom of this 
crisis, further highlighting the general feeling of workers and citizens that post-colonial (or 
post-apartheid) states have not delivered the general improvements in livelihood and well-
being that were expected after liberation, nor did they curb the exploitative effects of regional 
and global capital investmentÕ Laterza (2015:138). The implications of this connection between 
history and temporality is further illuminated by the discussions around the co-relevance of 
																																																								
4
 The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) was one of the main pro-democracy groups challenging the 
annulment of the June 12 1993 Presidential Election by the military and which continued to oppose General Sani 
AbachaÕs dubious transition programme.  
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uncertainty and stability. Describing this relationship in the context of Bissauian society, 
Henrik Vigh (2009: 421) argues that:   
ÔThis is not to suggest that everything in Bissau is adrift and afloat. There are, in fact a 
multitude of both cultural and social institutions that seem relatively stable and 
enduring, one of which, ironically, is the existential uncertainty caused by the dire 
economic situation and political unrestÕ.  He goes on further to note that ÔBissau is a 
world of uncertainty, of anticipated yet uncontrollable difficulties and hardshipÕ (Vigh 
2009: 422).  
The key here is that the uncertainty is anticipated, yet hard to control, indicating that it has 
become the context of life rather than a temporary rupture. It is precisely in this sort of dynamic 
that temporality and history interact and are able to generate social actions capable of 
reproducing patterns of social relations or of rupturing them in profound ways. It is important 
to note that there have been many moments like the one described above in Port Harcourt and 
around the Niger Delta more generally. The presence of these multiple contingent moments 
however does not do damage to the point being made here, nor does it undermine contingency 
as a useful analytical tool for thinking about the Niger Delta or similar contexts. Indeed, 
multiple contingencies are what ultimately create the fluid social universe where constant 
ruptures, mutations, uncertainties and reconfigurations are central to life and in which Delta 
youth and their counterparts around similar contexts live in. Scott (1998) makes a similar point 
about the ebbs and flows of everyday resistance in the Malaysian village of ÔSedakaÕ when he 
writes that due to the intersection of the multiple factors constituting our social environment, 
it is Ôalways emergent and unfoldingÕ thus requiring that agents have the Ôcapacity to adapt and 
read capricious environments (Scott 1998: 331).  
Youth are adept at these constant adaptations and readings of the volatile social environment 
in which they have to survive and, where possible, thrive. There are of course very 
individualized responses to this social environment. However, as Mbembe and Roitman (1995: 
324) note, there is also often a Ôregime of subjectivityÕ in which one may identify a Ôshared 
ensemble of imaginary configurations of everyday life, imaginaries which have a material basis 
and systems of intelligibilityÕ.  
Conclusion 
As a tool for determining who fits within the social space; what Amit (2015: 12) called Ôan 
abstract realm where social relationships are imagined and enacted, the story of UG described 
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above illustrates the importance of respect as a governing idiom in Delta networks. It highlights 
how individual actors imagine their place within the youthscape as Ôa manÕ, as Ôa senior manÕ 
or as Alaowei. When Pratten (2007), writes of Delta youth reminiscing about Ôthe rugged lifeÕ 
he is in fact articulating how their search for respectability is bound up in the social navigations 
within an oil political economy that offers few formal opportunities but in which informal 
opportunities abound. 
The biographical material used above also draws attention to the different contexts that frame 
respectability and teases out the tensions between self framing and social expectation. This 
tension is partly why studying respectability is so important to understanding the Niger DeltaÕs 
youth networks. Wright Mills (2000) makes a similar point about these sorts of tensions in his 
classic work ÔThe Sociological ImaginationÕ when he argued that illuminating the relationships 
between changing social structures and the personal challenges that individuals encounter in 
their context was the worthwhile task of social analysis.  
It is also apparent from the above that one of the major consequences of social uncertainty is 
that a global sense of contingency is imposed as well as generated by the struggles of youth. 
The spontaneous and the provisional seem to respond specifically and efficiently to the 
unpredictable nature of urban life. This is especially magnified in the postcolony as 
demonstrated by SimoneÕs (2004) interesting study of cross African case studies. It is however 
not simply that these types of relationships are useful but perhaps more important is that they 
are absolutely critical to the tactical agency of youth and without contingent skills, it is difficult 
to navigate the multiple uncertainties that they are daily confronted with.͒The need to 
improvise often opens up opportunities for both conflict and cooperation, for building bridges 
as well as walls and for creating as well as tearing down. 
The constant youth movements within the moral universe imposed by notions of respectability 
is achieved in large part by the tactical imperative of contingent networking. In short, 
contingency is the tactic while respectability is the goal. The ability to creatively and constantly 
adapt to a fluid alternative universe while maintaining useful connections to the moorings of 
old traditions or authorities is a trait many have identified in those Asef Bayat (2004) called 
the Ôinformal peopleÕ. This adaptability is captured in part by VighÕs (2009) concept of Ômotion 
squaredÕ, which, elicits imagery of the earthÕs double movement- on its own axis, at the same 
time as in orbit around the sun. So, while youth have to respond to changing notions of respect, 
much of which are produced within their social spaces, they have to, at the same time, tactically 
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engage with the everyday implications of the broader oil economy through adaptable 
contingent networks. This seems an obvious point in that all social action has elements of this 
double movement, however in the context of a Delta youth literature that privileges fossilized 
social categories (youth vs elders; state vs communities; oil extractors vs oil bearers; armed 
forces vs youth militants and so on), it is an important one.  
It, first of all, helps to illuminate more clearly the role that agency plays in the social life of 
youth. By highlighting how youth express themselves within constantly changing 
environments, this framework makes it possible to break away from the constricting 
perspectives of scarcity or of the binary frames of resistance and repression. It recognizes that 
these factors exist within the social imaginaries as well as in the realities of life for Delta youth, 
yet, it is able to see beyond them and account for important processes of change. It does this 
by placing the entire analysis of youth action within the context of constant motion and change, 
treating both the analytical space as well as the human subjects of research as fluid and 
changing. With an analytical frame such as this, it becomes untenable to see social positions 
as unchanging or to ignore the constant reconfigurations of relationships, of networks and 
indeed of goals that are evident in the Niger Delta. The dominant frameworks of scarcity, 
resistance and repression that have driven the Niger Delta literature can only effectively capture 
the broader macro contexts of oil politics but, as shown here, are not as effective when they are 
applied to everyday social networks around which life is organized in the region and which are 
the focus of this study. It is in the light of this that this study adopts the sociological and 
anthropological insights derivable from the interrogation of permanence, uncertainty and 
navigation as frameworks for thinking about the the Niger DeltaÕs youth networks.  
Ultimately, what respectability and contingency show in the Niger Delta is that social 
mobilization can often depend on factors not directly related to the political and economic 
issues around which social competition is framed. In the end, the everyday micro-politics of 
organizations, networks and individuals can be more important to the broader frames of politics 
than is often acknowledged. The examples of UG and of the making of the OX in Colombia 
provide compelling illustrations of the strength of the everyday and highlight why social 
accounts of large scale political competitions need to be more attentive to the subtle forms of 
mobilization that underpin participation.         
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